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Abstract: 
 
Preclinical (predictive) screens for psychotropic drugs are often used, incorrectly, as animal “models” of 
psychiatric disorders, or to study “disorder-like” behaviours.  This misunderstanding is contributing to 
poor translation and is undermining confidence in behavioural neuroscience.  In this editorial, I discuss 
some of the reasons why the interpretation of results from many of these procedures is dubious 
because the criteria for validity of the test, as a model of the disorder, have been ignored. Arising from 
this, I propose that the description of any abnormal behaviour of rodents as a “model” of a psychiatric 
disorder, or even “disorder-like”, without evidence-based justification, should be regarded as 
unacceptable in this journal.   
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[Editorial text]  
A distinguished colleague commented recently that neuroscience papers in high impact journals are now 
often “decorated with some behavioural data in order to strengthen their translational relevance”.  
Unfortunately, behavioural neuroscience stands accused of a poor record for translation and the 
accumulating disappointments are undermining the entire field. Poor experimental design, subjective 
bias and inappropriate statistical analysis are currently attracting the most attention as causes of the 
problem.  However, in many cases, the explanation could arise from flawed interpretation of the 
behavioural data. For reasons I explain below, I propose that this journal takes the lead in no longer 
condoning automatically the description of any abnormal behaviour of rodents as a model of X-disorder, 
or ‘X-disorder-like’, because such claims often carry little, if any, scientific justification.  
 
Experience has confirmed that procedures such as Porsolt’s Forced Swim Test, the Elevated Plus-Maze, 
the Light-Dark Box, the Open Field and many others can be efficient screens of compounds when looking 
for new antidepressant or anxiolytics drugs (of certain chemical classes). The problem is that many 
researchers go on to assume that, in the drug-free state, these tests can be used as “models“ of 
depression or anxiety. Equivalent assumptions are made for other psychiatric illnesses:  a particular 
bête noir of mine is hyperactivity in the Open Field, which is now being used as a “model of bipolar 
disorder”.  Such claims show a fundamental misunderstanding of the status of predictive drug screens 
(see: Willner 1984), which have never been validated as animal models of anything.  As a consequence, 
the scientific literature is being progressively riddled with dodgy conclusions.  
 
A specific example of this violation is when animals that are the first to give up swimming in the Forced 
Swim Test are regarded as expressing something akin to depression. Another is when it is inferred that 
animals that spend little time on the open arms of the Elevated Plus-Maze are anxious.  This is 
equivalent to concluding that, if all drugs that make rats whistle the national anthem turn out to be 
antidepressants in humans, then animals that do not express this behaviour in the drug-free state are 
depressed.  To put it another way: it is often claimed that a deficit in struggling in the Tail Suspension 
Test reveals depression-like behaviour but, if two humans were suspended upside-down, against their 
will, I doubt that a difference in their struggling would be attributed to one being more depressed than 
the other.   
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Neither of these points has any bearing on the validity of these tests as screens for antidepressant 
drugs. It is even possible that by increasing motor activity, which is an action shared by all 
antidepressants in these tests, the response to these drugs translates directly to humans as a beneficial 
effect on motor retardation in depression. Whether or not this is the case, it cannot be inferred that 
stress-induced immobility in these tests is a rodent version of depression. 
 
To be pragmatic about this, there are more than twenty diagnostic features of depression in humans but 
neither a motor deficit, when confined within a tank of water, nor a reduction in struggling, when 
suspended upside-down, is on the list.  Similarly, anti-anxiety drugs increase activity on the open arms of 
the Elevated Plus-Maze but most people would regard any reluctance to ‘walk the plank’  (i.e., to 
venture onto the open arms of the maze ) in the drug-free state as a sensible decision after a risk 
assessment, rather than a sign of a psychiatric illness.  Indeed, increased activity on the open arms could 
indicate reckless or impulsive behaviour. As for the Open Field (and other tests that rely on contrasting 
environments), it is rarely possible to tell what is being evaluated because the interaction between 
emotionality and ambulation, and the possibility that the experimental intervention has altered the 
animals’ sensitivity to light, are usually ignored altogether (Stanford 2007). We should also be wary of 
the recent rebranding of some behavioural screens. For instance, I note that the Social Interaction and 
Marble-Burying tests, which have been used for decades to screen anxiolytic drugs, are now being used 
to score poor social function and perseveration of mutant mice in preclinical research of autism.  
 
Many authors agree that describing an abnormal behaviour in rodent preclinical tests as a “model” of a 
psychiatric disorder is stretching anthropomorphism too far and flag this insight by describing them as 
‘disorder-like’ instead (i.e., depression-like, anxiety-like….).  This is disingenuous:  it implies that authors 
are fully aware that scores for these behaviours depend on the animals’ environment  (unlike psychiatric 
disorders, with the exception of specific phobias) and disappear when the animals go home (unlike 
psychiatric disorders, with the possible exception of agoraphobia). However, by describing the 
behaviour of interest as “X-disorder-like”, researchers are hedging their bets and trying surreptitiously 
to persuade readers that the behaviour they have evaluated is analogous to the psychiatric illness they 
are researching.  
 
As implied above, the possibility that environmental context influences animals’ behaviour should 
always be regarded as a relevant factor, not least because most procedures impose some degree stress 
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on the animals. In some cases, this involves merely exposure to a novel environment and separation 
from its cage-mates.  For others (e.g., the Morris Water-Maze), the validity of the test relies on the 
stress being severe enough to motivate the animals to perform the task as quickly as possible. What we 
need to know is how animals behave when they are not exposed to such threats. An ethological study in 
their natural environment would be ideal, but studies of animals that are group-housed in their home 
cage would be a step in the right direction. So far, there is no way of profiling multiple aspects of the 
behaviour of an individual under these conditions, still less interactions between cage-mates, but 
promising technologies are in an advanced stage of development.   
 
Another limitation, mentioned above, is that psychiatric disorders are diagnosed on the basis of a 
constellation of problems (of different weightings), not a single feature. Moreover, different 
combinations of symptoms and signs in humans can all qualify for the same clinical diagnosis. This 
means that even conscientious scientists, who carry out a routine battery of three or four different 
behavioural tests (which usually merely evaluate different types of motor response, but not mood), 
cannot claim to be satisfying any diagnostic checklist.  For people who use only one test, there is the 
additional confounder that this might, at best, reveal an endophenotype, which could be evident in 
several different psychiatric and neurological disorders. For instance, a deficit in social interaction / 
social withdrawal is evident in depression, social phobia, schizophrenia and autism, while perseverative 
behaviour is seen in anxiety (OCD), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and autism.  
 
Obviously, the definitive way to validate an animal model of a psychiatric disorder would be through 
back-translation of a specific (human) biomarker. Unfortunately, biomarkers are on psychiatrists’ wish-
list too.  Until then, the validation process rests on finding combinations of multiple features of the 
model that best resemble those seen in humans suffering from the disorder of interest. These would 
include behavioural, neurochemical, hormonal, pharmacological and, increasingly, genetic factors. A 
good example of that approach is the olfactory bulbectomized rat, as a model of depression (Kelly et al., 
1997), even though we should bear in mind that that depression is not explained by olfactory 
bulbectomy in humans. 
 
Probably the biggest gremlin is the blinkered assumption that the experimental intervention is the direct 
cause of the behavioral change of interest. For instance, if a gene knockout exacerbates immobility in 
the Forced Swim Test, it is usually concluded that the gene is responsible for preventing the immobility.  
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The possibility is rarely considered that the exact opposite is the case: i.e., that expression of the gene 
could be responsible for promoting movement when animals are stressed, rather than preventing 
stress-induced immobility, and that these are two neurobiologically distinct processes.  
 
Furthermore, by analogy with the complementary neuronal networks that regulate appetite versus 
satiety, sleep versus arousal or pain versus analgesia, it is highly likely that networks that promote 
depression versus antidepression, or anxiety versus antianxiety, have similarly dedicated functionality. 
This point reflects the proposal that therapeutic drugs do not target the cause(s) of the psychiatric 
disorder, but bypass the locus of the problem and restore normal function by following a different route 
through the brain (see: Reid and Stewart 2001). This could explain the different features of relief of 
depression by ketamine and classical antidepressant drugs, for instance:  whereas one switches off 
depression, the other switches on antidepression.  This dissociation is why a monoamine theory of 
antidepression is still viable, despite the monoamine theory of depression now being regarded as 
implausible or, at best, a special case. 
 
These disparate possibilities need to be considered as a matter of routine: i.e., that a behavioural 
change following an experimental intervention (e.g., gene knockout) could arise from either promotion 
of stimulation of one response, or loss of inhibition of another (or vice versa) and that it is possible that 
neither of these interpretations has any bearing on the cause of the disorder or its relief following drug 
treatment. In short, to restore confidence in the conclusions from preclinical behavioural procedures, 
we must ensure that the results are interpreted cautiously and that all possible explanations are 
considered - not just the one that appears to fit the preferred hypothesis.  
 
All these points will be familiar to preclinical psychopharmacologists who, as readers of this journal, will 
certainly think that this article is preaching to the converted.  However, we evidently need to be far 
more rigorous in ensuring that misleading and partial science does not slip through the peer review net. 
To thwart the skeptics (who have a point) from succeeding in throwing out our baby with their bath-
water, I propose that this journal should not publish any paper that describes an abnormal behaviour as 
a “model” or ‘X-disorder-like’ unless there is a consensus among the editors that such a claim has been 
plausibly validated.  I am confident that few, if any, will qualify. For those that do not, the behaviour 
should be described in terms of exactly what it is: e.g., swimming (stress)-induced immobility; open-arm 
activity; ambulation in the light arena, stress-induced anhedonia…. An example of how this reductionist 
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approach could make a crucial difference to whether or not a drug action in rodents translates to the 
target therapeutic application in humans is explained in Stanford (2014).  By being more circumspect in 
the interpretation and validation of behavioural ‘models’, and peer review of such studies, we might 
ensure that promising findings that are reported in the Journal of Psychopharmacology have a better 
record for successful translation than those in some other journals with stellar impact factors.  
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